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lN THE SUPREME COUR'~f
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
I

Tn the

~l ntt c~r

I

of the F~~-d.n tc~H

of
'\'-liT ~Tjl A \I ROBER'r "\VTl.JIJIA3lS,
also kno,vn as
'VILLI.~.~1\l R. 'VJTJ 1T ATVTS, and
S.i\.R.1\.II COR.LERS ''TILLIA~1S~

Deceased.
GL~ADYS '~TILLIA1viS,

I
rI

\

Case
\

...
I'

No. 9093

also kno\vn as

T ANl.A_ K_._;\_ROL,
Petitioner a;n.d Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATET\'lEXT OF FACTS
Respondent feels that a better understanding of the
rase and its issues can be had lJy T(!~tating the ease history, and the nature of evidenec which appellant stated
she could produce~ and the evidence which appellant
stated could n.ot be produced, ,\~}1ich resulted in tho summary judgment.
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Decedents are the natural parents of respondellt,
Inez \'Ti11iams ''rarshaw, who v-.ras appointed administratt·ix of their estates (R·. 1-9) ~ Before tl1e time for distri.
butio11 of the estates, petitioner, 01adys ''l"illiams, also
l'rlo,vn as Tania Karol, filed her petition (R. 31-33) claiming the right to inherit upon oue or the other of t\vo
alternative grounds!

.

(a) "Cnder the laws of SUt('t~SSlOll as the ]egally
adopted daughter of decedents ; or
(h) l.:nder the laws of testaty by the termf-; of an

holographic will executed in September, 1956, by de~
cedent l;\Tilliam Robert ''lilliams, giving to petitioner all
of the real property of decedent.
RespOTldent filed her an~nvcr denying both al1egations (R. 23) and propounded interrogatorjes to petitiouer (R. 21,. 22, 23) by way of disr..overy, to vlhirh

petitioner made ans\ver (R. 24,. 25) ~

Petitioner, also by way of
sition of respondent (R. 67) .

discovery~

took the depo-

Upon the basis of the answers by petitio11er to those
interrogatories shoV~-Ting lack of evidence of facts necessary to establish either of the allegations in the petition,
1·espondcnt made a motion for summary judgment of
dismissal {R. 35). This was heard before the court, but
before the court rendered it~ judgment petitioner obtained permission to amend her petition so H~ to allege
that., instead of being actually adopted by decedents,
decedents made a contract of adoption \vith the natural
mother of petitioner, \vhich Vta.s fully performed and
2
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\\'hh·h Khould be spp('j ficn lly enforced for the benefit oi'
p(l1 i1 io11cr to the extent of an equal share of the t~st ates of

(i (l('(.. det 1t. The amendment "-us as fo llo,\-~~ ~

''Petitioner is en tit led to inherit from der.(ldent~ \rilliam l{ol)(_lrt \Jlilliams and Sarah Corle~~
'Villiams on an equal basis 'vith said Inuz \Villiams
\V n r~hn \V, h y virtue of a contract under V~-7 hich
t.ht~ de('edents, for good and valuable consideration~ SPverally promised to adopt the petitioner . ''

Th Preupou respondent again utilized the processes
of diseovery to asccrtai1l \\-hat fa.c~ts petitioner claimed to
1• (· n h le t o est a b1i ~ h upon t lH_~ bu s i s of 'v1~ i <~ 1~ p c t i t i o 11 e r
eonld pro \-0. t1 L{~ px: i ~ t ()nrc and na 1u J'(l of au y such purported eon tract of adoption; and the nature of the evidence that petitioner claimed to be able to prese11t to
c ~tab1ish t 1H)~l.\ f aets~ Pfh e in tcrroga to ries (I-t ~ T-~R) Hnd
the :1 11 H\\' crs ( 1~·~ 42-47) h~v petitioner~ together \vi th the
prior interrogatories and ans\vers, with the deposition
of respondent, \Vere agaiu rna 1_l{_\ the basis for a motion
for summary judgmenL Innsmne1~ (u:; peti l ioner, in anfn'\·cr to Interrogatory 10 (R. 46) claimed that the eourt
record in a divorce proceeding bet\vuen her father and
moth Pr, (l ar·rol Y. Carroll, file No~ 16060 in the TJ ~ j l'd Distriet Court, \vould establif.;h, or tend to eE-;tablLsh the exi~
tence of such a contract of adoption, the said court file
\Yns offered and recci,~t~d for ron~iderat.ion by il1c ('qnrt
as a part of the offer of proof by petitioner in oppo sition to the motion for summar). judg"ni(_lJLt.. (R. 91-120)
The court thereafter granted the motion for sum~
mary judgment upon the grou11d that~ a~suming that p(~
titioner coul(l and would produce all of tl1e evidence that

3
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she claimed to he able to produce:r and assuming it ,-..~ere
tlncontradicted~ it nevertheless 'vould not be sufficient to
make a case for consideration of a court or jury {R4
5:1-34), and did not sho"\v the existence of any such contraet of adoption as claimed by petitioner~ (R. 53-54)

We shall assume, as appellant has assumed, that
appellant has abandoned the original allegation of actual
adoption and is relying on the amended petition alleging
an agreerner1 t to adopt.
Since petitioner makes no further referenee to or
aTgument in support of the hologrHphic 'vill a11egations,
've shall also assume that that phase of the ease is also
abandoned.
The follov,ring bas"ir. far.ts are admitted by petitioner
in her a11sv,.;ers to interrogatories:
1 ~ Petitioner does not kno\v of any adoption pro-

ceedings in a11y court

(l{~

21, 24).

2. Petitioner has no records showing that there were
any such court proceedings {It 21, 24}.
3. Petitioner has in l1er possessiou no \vl'itten document of any kind to substantiate the fact of adoption by
either of decedents (R. 22-~4 ).

44 Petitioner believes that there was an agreement
for adoption; that it Vlas in \Vriting; and that it was
signed by decedents and hy Cora Carroll, the natural
mother of petitioner ( R~ 27, 42). Petitioner has never
seen such a document (R.r 27, 43)4 In answer to interrogatory 4~ petitioner made the followh1g answer (R. 43) :

4
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

".\ t the present t in1<.l I kno'v of no indiYidual~

\vho t·ould. te~tify that tlll\Y hall seen a \Yritt< ·11 ron tra('i of adoptio11, that they kn e-v{ its contents, or that tl1ty had observed anyone sign su{!ll
a do('urnent. I haYe been informed that the attor.
TH!Y,. Ron J oluus~n1, is HO"\Y deceased. H 0\\-(l\TCr,. tbe
custodian of the records and files of his practice,
if such records are still in existence, may be able
to furnish information coneerning such a document . '"'

' r c also quote t1Je
rogat.o 1·y

tj ( R..

follo,vj 11g< ans\vcr

(It. 43) to

inter~

27) :

".! \ .s stat cd in my answer to Interrogatory Nor
lj I do not know 'vhether a \Vritten contract was
signed by the parties. If the contract was oral, I
do not kno1\"" the exact time, place,. or parties pTcsent. Ho\vever, the evidence available to me indicates that the parties present would have inc1uded
1\f r~ and 1\f l".S. vVil1iams, 11: l"S. Cora l~n rro1l and,
possibly, t ll e fl tto rney, Rcn J oln1son. 'l,he conversation refcrL"ed to in my answer to Interrogatory
!\ o. 1, if deemed to constitute an oral contract,
v,;--onld shovt that there 'vere present :J.Irf.;. Cora
Carroll, Thlr. and ~.frs~ Williams, and William Turner.. The substanee of the agreement was that my
natural mother would permit ~\I r+ a1h.l :\-1 t·s . \Jlil~
Iiams 1.[l rais<.~ rno ~L~ tl1eir da1]~htr.r, that my natural mother 1vould abandon all claim to me~ and
that ~.Jr . and ~frs. \Villiams would adopt me and
raise me as their own/'

Petitioner s t atcu in ans,vei' to interrogator~~ !) ( R .
28) that she llns a document ~igned lJy de(~cdentf-1 purporting to substantiate or establish an agreement for
adoption (R. 46).. \\Then requested in interTogat.ol'y 10
to state \Yhat t11e docurocHt i~ and '\\"'here i~ may be Reen
5
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( lL 28), she refers to an ·L. D~ S. Church baptismal reeord

( 1{._ 46, 41)

\V

hich is noi. signed by either of deeeden ts ;

also some

let.t(~rs

~he rc~fers

lo the divorce

signed "Your loving parents n; and
proceedir~gs ht~t.~'een

urn l paren 1.~ ( R. 46), to \vhieh ref cr( ~Jh·~~

~Till

her nathereafter

be mader

rl,he natural mother of petitioner "\Yas 1i yj ng in Salt

Lake Cit.y,

l~tah,

and the natural father of petitioner

\vas living ir1 Canada when the purported agreement for
adoption "\Yas made (R. 47) ~
~f'hc

natural mother of petitioner was the sole par-

ticipant of l1cr parents in the purported agreement (R.
28, 47).
Decedents 'vere living at 844 Washing-ion Street~
Salt Lnk{~ (~ity,

Utah (R.+

28~ 4"7)~

Tl1e purported agreement ,\-a.~ mHde \Vhen petitioner

\vas u ine -ntonlhs old (It. 28 7 4"7).
The balance of the evidence \\·hich lh~titioner claimed
to he able to produce ( R. 42-47) re1rd.ed to eonduct and
corre.sponde nc~e ·C-onsistent v..Tith n ny one or more of the
fol~"~ing

\Yhich

[t

relationships: (a) X at ural parent and ebild,

admittedly

~Tas

not; (b) actually adopted child

in acr~rdance \vith the ~tat utcs of lTtah, of 'which there
was no evidence; and (c) the ·relationship of loco parentis.,

'vhich it obviously was~

6
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The only rourl record 'vhich petitioner clainu.~d to
be able to produce to establish her relationship to decedent~ and "\V h ich p<) t.[ t[oner c1 aimed \VO nld est ~·d •l is ll, or·
tend to e~tablish the P xi~ t encc of a ('on trru·t of ad option,
\rns the (·asfl referred to in aus\ver to interrogatory 10
(R. 46), \vhich court record 'va~ produced and received
for r( )nsidera tion of the court at the hearing of the motion for snmmar·y judgment. The entire file in that. ra ~c
has been certified to this eourt as part or tl1c record on
appeal in th i 6 ''a~(). Hy judicial allegation, admiRRion
and de(·r~~c it P~t abli~lJed exactly the opposite of ~,-hat
pet itioncr Rn id it 1vould prove. The relationship of petitioner to decedents \Vas one of the issues in the cas(.~.
,,~ e q note the foll ovring from the c.ounterclai m of t1t<~
father ( R.~ 103) :
"'That' the said plaintiff \\' ho ga vc birth to a cl1 ild
nfter she -e.amo to C ta h~ gave the child a."\\ray to 011 c
"\\!". R4 "'\Villiams V\-Tl10 no'v has the cl1 ild, 'vi1.lH)Ut
the kuo"\vlcdge (Jf conHent of defendant., and that
plaintiff told said defendant and others that the
said defendant. \Vf-H-1 not. the father of .Rairl ehild."

and the follo,ving from tlle reply, under oatl1t of nu·)
mother ( R~ 106):
"Rhr~ admit~

that 8he gave birth to a child shortly
after ghe reac.hed Salt I~ake City, Utah, but denies
that. Rhe gave it a:,,-uy to one '1-tr~ R~ ''T11liams or any
other person, but allegr8 t.hr far.t to l)e that at
that time, on aecount of her then poverty and
sickness slH.) \\·a~ unable to give the child a pl'oper
home) and the said W~ R. Williams o IIerr.d to take
the el1ild and properly rear it until such time as
she (.'OH! d gi re it a proper hom.e a·n d rearing.''
(Emphasis supplied)
7
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rrhe last \YOrd that

\\-(~

tlu~tr.fore~

from 1he
mo t.lu:r, 'v ho pc ti ti on er claims nnu 1P the pu rpo rtc d oont ra~.t of adoption Vlith decedents when petitioner \vas
u·i-nc -rno·nths old, is the mother JB ~tatement under oath
when petitioner \Vas three years old tl1at there \vas only
a fe·n~-pora-ry placing of petitioner with decedents, for
financial reasons, and that when things improve she (the
mother) has the right 1.0 and will take petitioner back.
have,

rrhe decree of divorce vras not entered until DecemlJer lJ., 1917 (seven years after the purported agreement
of adoption). The court a \\Ta rded petitioner to her
rnotliOI\ \vh it~l1 v~~as, under Ute la'\\.T 1 subject at all timeA to
the rights and duties of the father under the laws of
Utah relating to parent and ehild .
In the presence of this record as to tllc full extent
of the evidence Virhic.h }Jet 1t.i·oner claimed she could and
\vould be alJlu to produce at a. trial of the if.=.8Ue~~ the
motion of administratrix for Hummary judgment (R. 35)
\Vft8 granted by tl1c trial court (R~ 53-54) ; from which
order of dismisal this appeal is taken.

STATkL~:iENT 0~,

POINTS

~~ ~Huming

that petitioner c.ould present evidence to
the full extent claimed by her in her answers to interrogatories and as presented a~ the pre-trial conference~
i 1 '\Vas not suffieiet1t to \\'arrant recovery by petitioner for
the follovling reasons :

I. Pcti tioner did not offer to produce any e\·idenr.e

8
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of any contract made and signed in the
court as required hy the

~ta

tu te~

of

pre~crH·e

of tho

L t a h ; and

I L rrherc \rn~ no cv1dente offered that tl1e father of
pPtit ioner (~\'Pr at any 11mc eon~eut.(~d to any snrh purported agreement of adoption; and

111. There Vt'as no evidence that there \\~as any
agreement of adoption bet\veen the mother of petitioner
and decedents. The evidence ,,~hich petitioner V{Ould have
offered. namely, the s-'vorn statement of the mother, one
of tlte parties to tl1c purported agreement of adoptionr
\\·a~ to the effect that there 'ltoa-s no such agreement. This
s~~orn statement v.ras conclusive on the subjcet
There
"-as no :suel1 purpoTted agreement.
+

1\.:--. Tn the a bse nee of a legal adoption under the
statuh~~ of Utah, an individual \Vho js not t.he nat urn l
child of decedent is not entitled to inherit under the la~,_s

of succession iu this State.
ARGUl\tF~XT
PoiNT

I.

PETITIOXER !liD )JOT OFFER. TO PRODUCE
oF L~N'T coxTRACT ~:t:~~DE A:XD
SIGXED IX THE PRESRX(;E OF THE C()URT AS
R.EQl~IR.ED Bl:-.- THE SrrArrlTTES OF urr_\H~

). x-r- E\TIDENCE

The brief of petitioner, in substance and effect, requests this court to ignore, repeal or di.~regar<i the ~tal
utes of this State relating to contractE-; for the adoption
of minor children ; and to pay- no attention to 1he rna ll y
cases decided by thi~ court relating to that subject.
9
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rl,lle transa<.~tion, out of \\-hich petit i oue l' elaims her
rigl~ts

to inherit as an adopted daughtel', had its incep~
tion ~hortly after the birth of petitioTICI' "~hcu sl1e ·w·as
taken into t.lu_• home of decedent~. She claims and allegQs
that tJH~re \Vas a (·out.ract bet\vecn her natural mother
'L tl(l uee.edent.s, entered into ~Then petitioner was nine (9)
months old, by v.rhich d{~("(~d(~rl1.H agreed to adopt petil io ner. She believes it 1\Tas in "\Vriting, but she has 110
one t.o so testify or to give evidence as to i 1.-, contents,
and if it \\·as oral she 1HH3 no one \vl1o ,~.~as present to tPsti ry as to what was saidr rrhere were no coutt. proceed~
ings in ("onformity 'vith t1u! statute~
Petitioner waA approximately three years old when
her mother filed her suit for divorce in 1913, so the pur~
ported contraet upon \\'ht(·ll pet-itioner must re1y \\-at5 made
in ln t.e 1910 or early 1911. It makes no difference. The
l:-1 \V in both years was the same, and is .substantially the
Rame today. T11 1910 and 1911 it v.ras as follows:

Compiled L·a\vs of Utah 1917.

OF CHITjD~S P_A_R_I£Xrrs NEC~SSARY, \VHE"\..-. A. legitimate child
cannot he adop1 (~d \Yitliont the (~(Hl~Pn 1 of it~ parents, if livingt nor an .illegitimate child without
the consent of its mother, if living, except that
consent is not IlCCessary from a father or mother
deprived of civil rights, or adjudged guilty of
adultery~ cruelty~ or desertion, and for either cause
divorced~ or adjudged to be a habitu:il drunkardt
or 'vho has been judir1.a11y deprived of the custody of the child on account of cruelty, neglcet, or
"134

(4.)

CO~TSENT

desertion.~~

"15. (6.) HEARING~ PROCEEDINGS.
rrhe person adopting a child and the {~Jiild adopted
10
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n n t1 the o 1~ H • r pc r ~ o n f.:.

'Y h o ~ r•

co 1 t ~ p n t i 8 1u.~c f ~ s sa ry,

appear before the judge of the dis t r1 et. court
of the eountr 'vhere the person adopting rc.'3idc~,
und thl~ r tP('PSSa ry consent m·ust thereupon be
s·ig·n f'd an rl an. agre(•Jn. en t be e:·rc(' n f rf/ by t /u) JU' rson atlopl-in.fJ to the effect that the child shall be
ado pf (·d an.d i-re ated in all respects as h·is ou·-n
/.anful (~hild; proritleif, that if the persons "\Yhose
consPnt is neccssar:r are not 'vi thin the county,
t.1u~n their \\·ri~ l ~~n <~onscnt, dul~y ackno\v1cdgcd in
tl1t~ manner provided for the ackno\vledgment of
dnPdH, shall be fi.Jed in said distri<"~t court at the
time of the application for adoption." (Emphasis
added)
n~ u st

"16.. (7 . ) DECR-EEr The judge must examine all persons appearing before him purr.;uant
to the preceding section~ each separately, and, if
satisfied that the interests of the child \viii be promoted by the adoption, he must make out an order
dcclarin g that tl1 e child sl1 all thenceforth be reg-n rdcd and treated in all reH pret s as the ehi ld of
the person adopting. H
~' l7r
(8.) CIIILD ·r A l\_ 11: S _F _A_ Jll L Y
N..:\.111~~. srrA'fT:S. 1\. ehild, when adopted, may
take the family name of the person adopting.
.i\.fter adoptiont the t\vo shall sustain the legal
relation of parent and child., and have all the rights
and be subject to all the duties of that. relation."
"1.8~
(9.) RIGHTS ~;\ "\""n DL"TIES OF
Pi\RENTS. The parents of an adopted child are,
from the time of tlul adoption., relieved of all paJ'(lntal duti(_lS towardA and all responsibility for the
child so adopted, and shall have no rights over iL n

:"\"'" o such proceeding "\vas h.ad, and petitioner knov\:-s of
no one living today ,,-l10 ean or \vonld te6ti fy that they
ever t:Ja \\. any sueh \vri 1ten agreement, v.rha t i 1s content.::;
"\\·ere~ ot~

'rho signed it~
11
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~,_he

f ollo"\\? ing eases from t}J i8 eourt ha vc determined
tl1e necet-1~ity of eompliancc vnth our ~t.atutory require~
men1.H in order to produce a binding and valid contract
cstablishin g the r ela tionshi p of parent and child by

adoption.
1'aylor v. W addou.ps

121lTta:h 257, 241

Pac~

2d 157

In this case the mother of a child actua1ly signed the
contract~

but ehanged llcT' mind before thr Court had a-pproved it. lt "\Va...~ Aigned before a X otary Public, which
could have been done before 1941 by pctsons u h~i~nt from
the State~ This Court held the eontraet, not in conformity \viih the statute no good.
~ ~ *'~It

is obvious that the so-called consent to

adoption 1~ras not made in eonformity with the
governing statutes, "~l1ich require that it be signed
before the distriet (~ourt of the county ,,-here the
person adopting resides.~'

't: 1.. lTpon the revisiou of the adoption Ia,vs
by the 1941 1Jegislature, this last quoted portion
of the statute was deleted. rl,he statute no longer
sanctions the relinquishment of a child £or adoption before a nc)tary public . Such relinquishment
is required to be done before a court . The adoptive parents, the child adopted, and the natural
parents or persons whose consent is necessary,
mn~t appear before the district court where the
consent must be signed, and the agreement executed that the child shall be treated as the lawful
chi1d of tlu.~ adopti-ve parents: n

t' 2. The purpose of this requirement is that
the court,. representing the public, can see that the
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pa rp n t ~ when thP y (·onsent to the adoption of their
ehildren are informed and fully understa11d the
effect of the rt(·1. \vl1ir.h they are performing. Tl1e
court shall cndea vor to prote-ct tl1 e parents from
fr~L nd, mi~rerescnt.ation or undue influe11ee in the
old.n ini ILg of their e(Htserlt.. Ofttime~, consents of
~Hlopt ton nrc signed l )y parents ·while under great
emotional stl·ain~ and, as in this caS(\ tl1ey may be
~igned ,\·hile the parent is suffering from diseouragentent and dcspajt, To cond nee the· \YC"~l
fa rc of all conecrncd~ this safeguard is established
as an assuranee that the parents lJave duly considered the <~onsequcnccs of their act~ 1,1u.~ Legislature has dcomcd this contract to he of too great
i rn porta nee to permit it to be signed before a notary public \vithout the benefit of consultation
\\-"ith 1 and supervision hy, a <+-Ourt."

The la\v 'vas the same when this purported eon t ru('t
was alleged to lu.1\·c boc11 made 'vithout Court approvaL

In Rc ..:1 d opt-ion of D ___________ _
122 Gt(1 h !125, 252 Pac. 2d 22-3
'~ 2, 3~

~ ~

* \Vhen the purported relinquish-

ment Wfl:-; signed, the mother was up against an
impossi hle ~ituation, both economically and on account of her health; hut the most important and
controlling fact was that the purported r.onsent
\\~as not exec11ted before the eourt. as required by
~1.atute 1 h11L v..""as an attempt to exec11te a consent
in a manner not authorized by law.* * ~"

Tn Re Ado pi irn~ (} l W aU o·n
123 Utah

380~

259 Pae~ 2d 881

Natural fa lhe r of child had not gi \·en r.onsent to

II ere i~ v-.T hat. tl 1is Court said on this polnt. It
is right in point and determinative of this case.
adoption~
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1 ~4. * * * Courts haYe not hesitated to build a
strong fori re~:-:; H rouru 1 the parcnt-ehild relation~
and have stoeked it \v ith ammuni t.ion in the form
of e~tablished rule8 that add to it.f-1 impregnability.
To sever the relationship successfully, one must
l1ave abandnned t.l1c child, and such abandonment.
must be specific intent go to do, ~ an i11tcnt to
sevt~r all correlative rights and duties inr.ident to
the relation;-.;hip. Such intent must be proved by
him \Vho aHsertt5 it, by proof that not only preponderat~s, but whie.h must be clear and satisfactory,
- - son1ethi1lg akin to that degree of pruof neeessary to esiabli~h an offcn~c hc.yond a reasonable
doubt, or~ as one authority put~ it 'h:. clear a11d
indubitable evidence.' rrhe relationship has been
considered a bundle of human rights of E-;uch fundamental importance as to lead courts frequently
to say that eoll sent is at the foundation of Hdoption statutes, that evidenee pcrtHining to it must.
be appraised il1 a ligl1t mo:_.,t fHvorahle to him
whose parental rigl1t is assaulted, that adoption
statutes being in derogation of 1be common la-v{ are
to be construed strictly in favor of the parent and
the prescrva tion of the relationship, (a 1111ough not
t.he rule in lJtah) and that all doubts Hre resolved
against. its destruction. The aut }1orities haYe gone
so far in their protcetion of t 1u•se kinship right~
as to hold t.hat a11 abandonment~ even thuugh a fait
accompli, can be the subject of repentanet~, absent
ve~ted rights in others. Ofttimes it is pointed out
that. abandonmentj 'vi thin the meaning of adoption
statutes, must 1)(_~ conduct evincing 'a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish
all parental claims to the child.~ ~ • • The importance of preserving the relationship clearly is
pointed up when one considers the 'veil-established
concept that custody ma.y be awarded in a proper
casPt '"'bile the courts may have no powpr to sever
the relationship, ~ aceounting for the principle
0
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that. 1h c· v,relfa re of the child is of great importance
in eustody cases~ but quite immaterial in adoption
rase~ until an effective abandonment of parental
rights is sho,VIL "\Vere the rule other,vise~ and an
indiscriminate sanction of the dispof.;sest-;ion of
parental rights without conAent vrere attempted~
Herious constitutional inpedimenta no doubt would
loom large under the due process clause." ~ .t. ~
~l r

t. ~n rro H TU.~V() r (•o n ~Pn t.ed to n n.\' con tract of adoptio JL 1\ ppe11a n t. ~~ proffered evidence not only proved
tlnd. t lt(l I'{) wn s no such contract~ but if there ''-'"as one by
1hr~ mothetl it \Vas a nullitY
... because the fatllcr did not
I

I

I

JOlll.

De r f.' rco.u:r; .J doption. Y.
_t

Brou~n

2 lTt.al1 ~d 30, 268 P:H"~~ 2d 995

This Court~ in this n1ost reccn t case, left no dou l)t
as to the uefes~iCy of consent and (~ourt approval to any
contract of adoption.
~~

1~ 2. The J uvenilc f~o11rt having plaeed the child rcn wit 11 the Sta t0 Department. of Pu hltr. \VelFnro l~or 'fn~tr~e home eare~ treatmen~, and super\. i ~1 on' \V h ile requIring the fa thcr to pay for s ur..h
c..are, the qtH)stion to he determined js v..~hcther snr..h
action is a judicial deprivation of the eustody of
Sl1ch ehiiJren an account of crueltyt neglect or de~Prt.ion within the meaning of the above section~
so that the conf.;ent of the natural parents is not
ne ce sRary· in adoption proceedi11 gs.. \~v- e think not .
Once a ehild is adopted 1L~ tics to its natural partL ut s . unlike in eR ~ {) ~ in v ol' ·in~ n1 Pre e u ~ t od y, i ~ permanently severed. Such a result, \Vithout the consent of the legitimate~ natural parentf.;,. has not
he en fayorcd h~~ courts, it being considered 1hn t
the na tn ra1 relations hip bet,vccn parents and child
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is of an enduring and sacred eharacter. Adoption
proceedings are statutory and based on consent
So 1Nhere statutes dispense with the -c.OJJsent of a
legitimate natural parent who for some misconduct has been deprived o"f the custody of his child,.
a strict construction is given such statutes in
cases in whlch the natural parent contests the
adoption.'' * * =~
See also Pet-ition of Th.o"!npso·n, 100 Utal1 ~10J 11.0 Pac~
2d 370 ; and Application nf 1JlorBe, 7 U tab 2nd 312, 324
Pac. 2d 773.
There a.re many c.ases from other jurisdictions~ \V e
give but a few to show that Utah if.; not peculiar in this
regard.

:i\1any of the arguments presented in this ease about
0
equitable adoption" etc..~ were presented to the Supreme
l;ourt of (~alifornia, in B<-tnc~ in l~e 1'aggarl 's Estate,
190 Cal. 493, 213 Pac+ R.ep. 504. By unanimous decision
the Court refused to adopt the program lhat would destroy the lrgal safeguards tlut t sn t•round this relationship.
1? aughan v+ Tfru.bbard (Idaho),

~21

1107~

Pac. Rep.

I u Re R e·i-nu~ r 's .l!.t'sta te ('V ash.)~ 259 Pac. Rep. 32.
It~

Re Meyers' E .state (Ore.), 254 Pae. 2d 227.

_rra<·ktf·ll v. Disi rict Court (Colo.), 295 Pa.c~ 2d 682.

In Re 81ni.th ~s Estate

(Wash~),

299 Pa.c.

~d

550.

Brassiell v. Brassiell (l\liss.), 87 So. 2d 699.

Cooper v. Bradford (Ark.), 117 S.W. 2d 719.

rn

Re Garloto 's Estate

(Mich.)~

21 N. W. 2d 178.
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In Re Olson's fJ&tate ( Jiinn.)t 70 N. \V. 2d 107 .

Killen v. K lebanoff, In Re Sherman's ~~:.-:;tate (Conn.),
98 A tl. 2d 520.

Glass, Admin-istratrix v. Gla-ss (Ohio), 125 X.
2d 375 .
Couch

v~ Couch~

E~

et al. (Tenn.), 248 S. ,V. 2d 327.

Jlarietta v. Foolkner (Ala.), 126 So. 635.
,.\-re would be less than frank

this court if we did
not admit tl•at there are some jurisdictions 'vhcre tl1e la'v
is less strict on these matters than in Utah. There are
some states that have permitted adoptions to be established by c.ontract only, and the existence of a contract
of adoption to be established by circumstantial evidene.c,
which is v,.-hat petitioner is seeking to establish iJl this
case, and there are still at this late date, some States
~rith

\vhere common law adoptions, common law marriages and
other types of relationships, producing rights of inheritance, may be loosely and informally created~ which are
rec.ognized by the courts. Utah has never been, and is not
no"r, one of those jurisdictions; and is not alone in that
policy. i\._ great majority of the States have adhered to
the policy that adoptionf.;~ and the making of agreements
of adoption should be more and more strictly sup revised;
and are throwing tho protecting arm of the c.ourt, as the
third party to the contract~ a.nd the 'Velfare Agencies,
around this most hazardous and important transaction.
The cases cited by appellant are fairly representative
of the nrinority group. Most of the cases can be distinguished, and the California case cited by appellant., Rad-

17
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ov·ich's Estate, 48 Cal 2d 116J 308 Pac. 2d 14 7 iH not in
point at all. The (~ase turned on the doctrine of stare
de(: i8L~· a·nd "\\."'3 s not derided on the merit~.

'V e submit

that the law· in thig State l1as a1ready been eRta.blished by

statute and de-risions, and that there is no purpose in
seeing what other states think of this.

rrhroughout appellant 1 8 hrief the relationshlp betv{e en individuals v,•ho are raised in the hou.seho lds of
others and the persons t.hus hest.o,vjng parental affection on children 110t their own is referred to a~ '" q_uasi''
adopted and ""de facto" adopted. Tlu:re may be some
t y r>es of re1atio nshi ps vthere something lef-18 than tho real
thing acquires a status whic.h the Jaw recognizes as of
sufficient legal ~ignificance to he guhstantially equal to the
real thing. In corporate and some types of contractual
relationships this is true in lT ta h. Hov.revcr, in U t.ah both
t"lu: right of inheri t.nnr·r· and the relationship of adopti\e
parent and child, which carries with it the right of inheritance, is purely statutory.. F,umily tic~, a~ sneh, are
closely guarded in Utah. t:~tah \\'a~ one of the earliest
Stntt~~ to adopt h:n\~i-! ostahlisbing vital statistics :-::.o that
there \vill be certainty on thi~ !:JU l1jeet~ a1ul to safeguard
the fa1nil:~.. relationship against unu uthorized e:s:pa11 ~1 on
thro1Jgh "de f:i('t on and ''qva~i tt relationships in fa\·or
of individuals \Yho are granterl ]lome ar1d aff\:t~Lion lJy
n•cmhers of the family of .:nu~ther.
lTtah }J(l~ never felt that. it s1tould make the extension
of hrotlH~rly h.l\·c or t.lH~ n•andate of 11H· Redeemer to Jove
thy neighhor as thyself and to look after and proteel the
orphan and tl1c fathPrless a haz.ardo11s enterprise simi-
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lar· to the dnn.~ets of permitting yr,ur· neighhor to t ra\·er·~e unimpeded across your land. To this datej in this
~tnt<· of Utah, \\'P haYt~ hCCll able to open our doors to th+.:
homelef.ts and extend aid 1o tlH; friendless 'vi t.hout fear
t.hat some "\~ested" right~ \Vill l1c ini1[a 1t~d or c.ita bli.~hcd
\\' hich may arise to "bite the hand that fed" after those
\\~ho could speak are llO longer here to testify.

'r e haYe~ hy statute, prescribed the method, a~ul the
ethud,. lry
established.

,,~hieh

rrlli~ \\'ftH

.:.~a~e

outy

Jn

not a

such a relationship may be

of ignoraTwe

ot~

of fn ulty exeeu-

_I\(·(·ordi n~ to the testimony 1\'hich
petitioner 'vo11ld add [lee, ~Irs~ Carroll \Vent to her la\vyer, ~lr. Ben t.Tohnson, \\'ho \Vas her attorney in her di,.l) ree c~a ~e, to find ont a Lout the la \\- of adopti011 in U ~ r~ h,
;uu] slte \VMS fully infornH.~(1 on the subjr.(·L rl,llff)' ·never
lHlrforman<.~-e.

iion or

'rent :~head 'vi th the legal adoption, hcca u~ (~ it 1\,..ould have
required the cont-;ent of the father, and right at thal time
the mother was prima.rily interested in getting a divorce
from ht~r husband; and in order to do so she \\·us U.cnying
the vc ry thing thHt petitioner says she did~
So~

in the a bf.;ence of some proof or offer of proof
of a contract of adoption, with the consent of the father
(.\I r. Carroll) in eomplian,~e ··- or even at teYnptcu (~.om
pliancc - W i tll t}u_~ (~ hOV(~ quoted SC<.:.tions 0 f OUT S t.atu tes,
the trial court very properly found that there ""Sas no
genuine issue to be tried.
X o end of confu~ion and litigation could result if
these basic harrieT~ to orderly and established relation-
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ships can be thus destroyed through aets of humanity
and kintln~ss.
Appellant states that 've are eoncerned v-.Tith a mat~
ter of property rights, not right to custody, and that
ou1· courts have not hesitated to specifically enforce contracts under \vhich property is to bo disposed of in a
certai11 ~Tay upon death. Counsel fails to distinguish between contracts to devi~e property in a t~ert ain way, .as
illustrated by the Utah cases eited in .appellant's brief~
and contraet.s to rreate a statu~~ such as ntarriage and
adoption, whieh require State approvaL The contraet to
devise is enforceable regardless of any Vr~iJl that may be
made, \vhereas a contract for Rtatus is subject to the rigl1t
of testamentary dispositiorL
Ilo\vcvcr~

our courts haYr strD.dfastly refused to grant
the right to inherit to individuals oc.eupying a "'de faeto"
or' 'quasi'' status \vhere the necessary steps to create that
status in acr.ordance 'vith the statute have not been
complied 'vith.
The eontract "\r hich appellant claims to ha ,. e been
made bet-\veen her mot l1cr and de<'edents:t and upon 'vl1ich
ghe is relying in this case~ was a purported coHtract for
sta-tus of appellant as adopted daughter; v,rhich status
\vould havP carried \Vith it thr right of inhel'itauce~ but
,,-ould have also <:Hrried '~ith it all of the responsibilities.
rrhe right of

~~de

fa<'t 0' ~ and "'quasi', ,v-ives to in-

herit under our ]av;~s has been before this court many
times; and eaeh time the right '\Yas denied 7 reg(l rdless of
tllC most }lumane and equitable reaSOliS for breaking the
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la \\' ~ The same arguments for lovrering the barriers to
ern brace" de facto" and "quasi" members of the family
unit into the definition of ''c.hildrcn, ' 1 as defined in our
la.\\·s of succession, vtould certainly apply to common la,.....\Vi\~ 0. ~, plural wives and step-children .
There are some rights, of property, that are dependent entirely upon status. Tn order t.o attain that
~tatus~ there arc certain things that, in la\\~ or ritual, must
be complied \vi tlL The right to inherit as a child of deeedent is one of those thingf.i. If not a natural child, one
must be adopted; and in order to be adopted the statute
relating thereto must be complied with. It is not gufficient
for tl1e status to be "de facto'' or ~'quasi n or ·~ equi~
1:lble n to qualify.

'r a11y

individuals may be ''de facto n or "quasi"
ettizens 7 but until tJ1cy have qualified and t.akcn the oath
they have no such rights t.o that status. rrhe same is true
of membership in most churches and~ in ttah, the official
family eircle4 It is not sufficiOJlt that an individual be
worthy of the status. lt must be an aer,omplished faet in
aceordance with the law~
rrhere is, therefore~ that difference between a contract for property or a property right and a contraet for
a status which has a right of inheritanr.e as a.n i11cident
of the status.
While it is not necessary to justify or explain these
conflicts in judicial decisions, the editor of .American ,Jurisprudence has undertaken to do so~ and v-.'"e give his
explanation, as his research has found it to be, as follO"\\'"S:
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1. .A.m. Juris., 629, Sec. 13, Adoption oj' rkildretL
'' Trhe distinction should be carefully noted
butv.leen an executor;.~ COTitract to adopt and an
{~X(~{·nted contract or a~n·(~ment of adopt ion. The
la 11.er con sti tnt c s ar1 art of adoption, in b'0·1ne
juri::.~d itt ions, the result of 'vhieh js equivalent to
that of judicial proceedings prescribed in the ma&
jority of the states~ and by it the chlld who i~ the
suhj (.~<~t of th l~ agreement becomes, in legal effect,
the child of the contracting party." ~ ~ €t (Empha-sis added)

'' 1\DO_P]~IOX BY A GRBETVT~XT OR
DEED. [~otne statu-tes authori.;e an adopf-i(Ht· 1Jy
dfP.d or co-ntract. T·he questi011 of the \·alidi t;y of
s ueh an adoption is quite a different one from that
of the enforceability of a contract to adopt, so far
as thr:. right of the ehild tu acq uirc property rigl1ts
unrlPr it; and the eontract. t.o adopt may be eTiforeeable eYen though the adoption may be \·oid for
\\·ant of compliance \\·ith the ~tatutc. n (.:~~mphasis
added)
l~t.ah

has 11erer autl1orized an adoption hy agreement or deed, and ltu~ -ncrt)r authorized any contraet for
adopfiont :-J~ distinguished from a crndrar:t to der·isr~ exceptiTlg', (1) UTlder jlHli<·ia 1 ('oni rol, (:2) whe11 in writing,
( 3) signed 1l ! . the father aud ·mother and ( 4) if the Court
1

approves~

The f.a{lt11nl situation dP~t·rihcd by appellant in
allS\Vt r to interrogatory ~To. 1 (R. 4:!) 'vas not, in legal
effect~ different from tha 1 ·w l1 i eh \\·as dc~(l tibed in H ar1~isou v. Hurl·r r 44 Ut.al1 541, 1-t~ Pac. 716. T-rue, it \Vas
a eustod~- case, not one involving- adoption~ but this eourt
1

7
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~);-.:tabli ..: hed

some \-Pry I~a~i<· prinri plcs~ \\·hi,~h have beeil
adh(~r{·~1 to to this date, and \\·hi(·]~ ;1r·~ nat{~d HH• ~1l'(~ug1 h(.~n[ ng- of adoption la ,\~:-; to make the S t.n te 1 acting til rough
t liP ( \nn·t, .a nece~~a ry part;~ to any contr:·H·t irrvolvlng the
en."' t od,\~ or adoption of ehildrenr I-lert~ if~ Vlha t the court
~aid on the subj eet of con tract~ affecting human beings :

\V e tlP(~d not l:l t this t irr~ e devote m n c}l ti Inc
OT spaee to tl~e q1H\~tion of gift. rrbe people Of Jl1is
count1·y sacrifieed ln1ndreds of thousands of 1i ves
and thousands of milliOllR of treasure to d(~st.ro:-·
the theory that there can be such a thing as a.
property right in a human being, even though suel1
being be of the lo"\vest type, and by the sante token
the question that any one may claim aJlY rights to
a child by virtue of a gift alone is foreYl~r set t1ed.
That a human being cannot be made the subjeet of
a gift has al\vays been the rule at c-ommon laY{.
Tlu_~ la'v upon that subject is V{Cll stated by ).f r
J u~t.icL~ Rre\VCl' iu Chapsky ,.r. Wood~ 2() f{an. 6r'J2.
40 .Arn~ I~.ep. 321, \V}Jere in speaking to a question
~ j mihu· to UH.~ one i 1 ~ vo1 ved }1 ere, the jnstir-e says :
~'

+

"" '..:\. child i~ not. in any sense, like a horse or
any other chatt()l, suhjer..t-matt.cr for alJsolnte and
irrevocable gift or (OU tract rl.,hc rat h c r (~a 11 not, b~r
merely giving a\vay hi~ ehild, re1eu.se l~in1sclf from
the obligation to 8upport it, nor he deprived of tho
right to its custody . In thl::.; it d[ffcrs from the gift
I

of any article \vhich is only property.' ,
t~ounsel

says that contractg for adoption of ehildr(_~11,
not in conformity with the statute, are not against public.
poiiey+ Ordinarily, the statute expresses the publir. policy
of the State. c~ertainly t.his pronOIH~(·ement l)y tll1s (•ourt,
so many yc.~a r~ ago, on the subject of "l ehild bartering n

togeihct "·ith tl~c

~1 atute

\Vill serve the purpose of a publir.
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poli<"·y until sometl1ing better sho\vs up b·y legislative
enactment.
PoT~T

TI.

THER.E \VAS X() EVTDf.~~(~E OFFERED TH1\.T
THE FATHER OF p_w·r1r:r10XER E"\7 FjR. AT .L<\NY
TIMB COXS~XTBD TO AX':r Sl~Cll Pl:l{PORTED
AG REE11l~N'l OF A DOPTT (J 1\.
1

One of the first principles of la'v is that it is not
only

c~~ent.ial

to sho-\v tl1at the euntraet cxistcdt but also

that the party purporting to make the contract is competent and qualified to make it+

.L.:\.ppellant alleges and states that this purported
r.ontract 'vas 1nade by her natural mother with decedents
'vhen s1H: \\'<1H nine months old. ...:\.ppcllant \Vas born
1\fn rch 18, 1910 (R. 41) so tl~u time of the contract 'vas
approximately December, 1910.
At that timet aceording to appellant's offered evidence, the natural mother was married to a.ppellant ~s father~ then residing in C.Hnada. Thi~ \Vas two yearf-3 before
the divorre tH~tion bet,veen her natural parent.~ was filed
(Rr 91)~ and f.!even ~veHr~ befote the final ·decree of divorce

'vas (!ntered ( R. 120) ~
U1u.lf~r

the stat nt.es of Utah then ou the bookst ~ec.

13 Comp. T. aws of Utah 1917,

r'

a· lrgit-tntaff' child ca.P-nof

be ndoptcd . u~itlloul flu: con.·:>"c·nt o_f its: part!nJs~

i.J l-iriug. ·r

.Appellant ~s father V\-'"as not only very mur.h ali\'(~ but he
a 1nl his o,vife had only j u~ 1: t-l()pa ru ted~ and he v,,..as e r r-n
thtn, protesting the fen~ para.1~y placing of appellant in
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d{~ecd<.~nt ,~ home~

~o

di \·orce action 1ras instituted until
t'vo yen r~ aftl~r the time al1cged for the making of the
}Hlrport l\d ('on tract, and seven years before the final
(h~c rt~e o i" di \·~) ITC.
Our statute i~ explicit on 1.lu~ sullje{~L ;\ ny purported
contract~

assuming that it were made, \vould he and \vas
a nullity. The nat.ural mother vras not competent to make
(lur ~uc}J (·otd.ra~l ~ and the decedents eould not have enfon·<~d H ny SIH~h contraet.. Both the mother and the L:11.1H_~r
('ould have taken appellant from deeedents at any time~
and there never \Vas a time "\Yhen decedents could have
claimed from appellant the legal rights of an adoptive
pn rent from appellant.
\\r e shal1 submit this phase of the brief on the l; t a J1
('H~(\~ ci 1Pfl

under Point 1~ the pert.i npn1. Utts h st ntu~ 0,

Sec. 13, Comp. Laws of Utah 1917, supra~ anrl the general
statements eontained in 2 C. J. S. 383, Section 21, relating
t n the 1l eeQ ssi ty of eonsn11t of natural parent~ to adoption
of legit[mate ehildren: and Am. Juris. 642, ScP. 40, .A.doption of Children1 relating to the effect of lack of consent
or notice to the natural parents.

Por:-.1T Ill.

THERE! \V-_A_S NO
'\'".-\8

r~\TID~~XCE

THAT THERE

..:\X\~ ..:\Gli~~F;}f~~NT t)~-. ADOPTI(J~ BETV{~~"FJN

THE ~IOT11"fi~R. OF
THE EVIDr~N(~E

PJi"JTITIO~ER_i_\.ND

D"FJCWDJiJXTS.
\VIIIC~I-I PE1,ITION:fJR \VOUijD
H1\. \~JiJ OF.,FERFJD, N.L\.JIELY._ rl.,HE S\V-ORN ST...~~T"FJ'fEXrr OF THW :\J( )THER~ OXE OF Til~~ PAH1 IF1~
TO rri-Ir~ Pl~1~PORT}~D .i\(J-R.EEME~rr 0]., _A_DOPrriON
"\f~\S TO THE E~.,FECT THAT THER.E J.VAS 1.V()
1
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~'Jfi()JJ AO·R~E87vfBNT. THIS S'\TORN STArrE~fENrr
V\T_AS Ct)XULl~SlVE 0~ TliB SUBJECT. THEltE
\\TAS XO Sl_; CH Pl.~RPORTtEI> ._.:\.QR.EEhiENT.

Assuming, \\dthout (Hlmitting, that a private (~on
tract for adoption, \\' ithout a pprnval of the court, were
legal and enforceable, appellant·~ proffered te~ tim.ony
'vould not establish the existence of a contract.
All of the partief.; to tl1e purported contract are dead.

Appe11ant knovrs of no one \\-Ito can testify that they
ever sa \\.T a contract or a~ to itH- contents (R·. 43 answ{]r to
iutPrrogaiory 4:).
ltppellant kno,\"~"S of no one 1.rho could 1e8t ify as to
ail y oT~aJ eontract (R. 4-3~ ansV¥·er to interrogatory ;) ) .
\\'11Jiam Turner, a half brother of appellantl ~Tould
testify that he 1NH~ prt~~ent 1r hen dec.edcnts came to the
home of (ippellant's mother, ~Then appellant was an
infant i that Mr~. Carroll did 11ot 'runt to sign aHy papers,
but deeedents 'vere insisting on a le,~nl adoption (R.
43~44).

This i~ the only direct evidence that aiJpellant promised f o prod11ce as to tlu~ exif;tPnee of n1,:~ such purported
contract. She offer~ much heresay e,·il1enee and some circumstalltia1 evidence, 'vhieh, as ~tated, is natural and norma] to nny 1oco-parcntis re1ntiouship as 'veil as to th(·
re1n tionsl1ip of na.tura.1 daugl1ter or adoptive duu~b1er.
neither of "\vhich ,\~a~ the real relationship.
against thest~ fa('t 8 "-hich ~tppella.n1 stated 81H~
could ~ho,\"~", she Rlso produc.ed the s'~rorn ~• nement of her
uutur(d mother. Ti \Vas in reply of her motht•J' to tl1e
_.:\ H
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rounter(~laim of

her father, char~-d ng-, arnong ot 11('1" things,
that t 11~~ Ino1l~er had given a ppelln Ht to d(•('(~dPnt~ ,,-it.hout
l ~ i ~ k TLo\v 1Pd g;e or co J1~ent ( R.. 103). This the mother
deni(ld (It. 106), hut on the other hand she alleged that
the d l ·<·( ~ ud<ln1 s 'v P l'e giving- appellant a home u uu I i.l such
t ;~~~~· ru. · .·. :he ( tfu...._ n~ot hr! r) <"O 1.dd .oi.1:e it a proper /unJJf' a·nd
rcrl r j II ,f/.
r r hi f.; "'a~ under oa tJ] undP r da t(~ of Fe l;ruary
j

,

1t\, 1013 (R. 10S).. This 'vas approximatel~y three years
n l"tt)r the date of appellant's birth (R. 41) and at least
two years after the date of the purported (_lO n trtv~ t~
Thcrcforr., tho only party to the purported contract,
\vho left a vrriting to he considered by the conrt, spoke

under oath, and denied the existence of any suc.h eontraet
as appella11t a11cge.s.
~\nd,

r.;trangely enough, that ~worn te~timony, the

only positive evidence on the subject, vras produeed by

appellant as a part of her offer of proof (R. 46, 106).

In t ht• face of that sworn cvidenr.e by the indiv[dual
tl1rough ,,-hom appellant claimf.; to derive her purported
<~on tractual right~ if such a thing 1\'""ere possible in Utah,
the hearsk' y and inferential l~\·idonee that appellant says
she could produce, disappears r.omplctely.

PorNT IV.

TX THE . .~BSEXCE OF ~~ LEGAL ADOPTIOX
l~XIlER rrii~J ST . ATl.rrrES OF UT1\II, . . ~N
.
lNDlVIDl- ~\ L WHO IS XOT THFj i\Arrl:RAT..J CHII1D ()F DECEDE)Jr-r IS XOT ~~~X1~1TLED rro 1Xllbl~l1, lJNll~~l{;
~rHE L..i\...\rS OF SliCCl~SSI<)X IX THIS ST~.\TE.
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rrhe right to inherit is pureJy statutory~ Our law of
sueeession is Seetion 74-4-5, Utah Code .A.nnotated 1903,
and the applicable portion i~ paragraph 2 as follo~,.s:
~,;

(2) If the deced . . ~nt leaves no surviving
husband or \vife, but lea V(~~ is~ue~ the \"vhole estate
goes to ~ uch issuet and if such issue consists of
more than one cl1ild livingt or 011e child living and
the issue of one or more deceased chlldren, tben
the estate goes in equal share:.-:1 to the children liv~
ing, or t.o the chi1d living and the issue of the deeoased child or children by right of represen.

tation . ''
It \\·ill be noted that the right of inheritance is limited to "issue."
Tl~ i ~

statute, ho,vever J i~ modified by Sc<~t ion '78-30-10
extending tl~c right of inhPritaneo to ''adopted
eh.ildren. ''

order to claim a right of inheritance as an adopted
child, the udoption must he est.H blished in accordance
1\Tith the statute.
T11

JJ orris r. 1 rotter, 202 Jo'' .a
1

Thi~

7

232~

210 X. ,,,., 131.

court in the recent ea~c of l'Ji Re S·mif h 's

r: .~·tate,

~·~-·. 1_, ta.h ---~- ., 326 Pac. 2d 400, again ref~sed to extend
7

the statute beyond its express ,\-(~rding, stating that any
~ueh action is for the legislature- not the couet.
Appellant's argument in this caRe goe~ even beyond
the lavvT contended for in Oa~ Smith Estate appeaL Here~
appellant in substance and effec.t i~ asking the court
to estnblish by judicial fiat the la"\\T of common la''" adoption8. This wou]d he even mOT(l dangerous than opening
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up the la"·~ of inht~ri ta n('e to common la'v 'vi\'~S ~'de
facto":'' w i \·(~ s, "De Jure, 'vi vc~ :~ nd other types of domestic relationship. This court ha~t ~o far, refused to
open the door to that t~~pe of judicial legislation, and we
respectfully urge that such matters should eontinue to be
l1andled by the legislature.
Raleigh- v. Wells

29 Utah 217,81 Pac. 908
Speaking of the applieability of equitable considerations to the right of inheritance, as applied to \vi vcs~ tl•is
Court said~
X o doubt~ if she had been a Ja,vful \vife,
she might have renounced rights under the will of
the testator, and then have appealed 'vith much
force to the conscience of the chancellor to so administer equity and justice as to save l1er home
to her; but, 'vhen she consented to become a
plural wife, she did so at her peril, in so far as the
lav.r of inhcrita.nc.e is eon~erned,. and, thereby failing to ac.qui re the status of a la,vful -.vife~ slJe at.
that time placed it beyond the power of the chancellor t.o grant her relief of the kind she now seeks,
for thenceforth she '\\""as without the pale of the
law of inheritance a~ to any property which her
husband had acquired or might thereafter acquire.
As to all such property she could but depend for
justice upon the will of him in whom she had thus
confided. Respecting his pro1Jerty, which he then
had or might in tl1c future acquire, she was, under
the law which she invokes, after such marriage,
as before, but a stranger, notwithstanding she had
assumed and diseharged the duties and responY<

=~-

:11:"
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sibilities 'vl1i(~h usually result from marr1age
rcla tionA." -= * *

By reason of strict statutory construction of la,ws
of adoption and ht\V6 of inllet·itance, an adopted child
inherit8 from both natural parents and from adoptive
parents. These matters arc purely statutory. Sometimes they work to advantage and sometimes t.he other
way.
ln Re

Jladse~J1.'s

Estate

123 Utah327, 259 Pac. 2d 595

*

~

''Dower is not a part of the marriage
con t rart, altho ugh marriage is a prereq u.isite. It
is a right arising~ existing atld passing by the
operation of law."' ~ ~ ~
!'

So, too, adoption is a contratt, \vith legal approval,
\\·hich produces a statu.s, one of the rights of whic.11 i~ the
right. of inheritance un d cr the lR'\\~s of s uc.cc ssion. In
order to have dO\\·Tr or inherit as a \vifcJ or to haYe. the
right of inheritance as an adopt (_jd child, legal marriage
and legal adoption are a prf'requi8ite.
See a 1so J.n ll e
2d

v· eta's Est a.t e, 100 l~ t a.h 18 7, 170 P ac.

183~

COKCL·CSION

The ,.t"~ry purpose of our nev.r Rules relating to discovery, pre-trial conferences nnd n•otions for Summary
Judgment, is to aYoid trials "-.. here no useful purpose
en n~ in t.1u ~ lo11 f!; rnn 7 hp served. ·r1 ~ e admission on the part
of appellant a~ to lack of evidence to 1) re stut a gen nine

JO
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i ~sue to he f.t[ed., ju~tified and required the action of the
trial ('ou 1·1 in ~topping- the (·ase by motion.

We respectfully submit that the case should be
affirmed.
Respectfull~y·

su hmittedt

RICH, ELTON &

~\I.AXGl!~l

By H. A. RICH
Attorneys for Respondent
307 Utah Oil Building
Salt Lake City 1, "(j tab
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